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should talk, uses language in ways as to make universal claims and to explain that God has
revealed Himself. Therefore, it would be proper for them as Christians to make such claims as
well.
Now, this possible interpretation holds fast to the internal relationship of language and
the world, and on this view, God would not be exempted. The advantage of this interpretation is
that it would be consistent with their assertions about our inability to know an unconstructed,
extra-linguistic realm. So, on such an account, the claim that God has given special revelation is
a particular and internal claim of the Christian community. But while this is a more consistent
position for them to embrace, nonetheless it raises two highly significant problems. We will
consider these in turn.
Constructing God?
First, despite their attempts to write in a manner that is consistent with what the scriptural
authors wrote, it seems that on their view, God ends up being a construct of Christians' own
language use. This seems to be the case whether or not God is on the inside of language.
Consider first if God is not on the inside of language. Nonetheless, believers cannot get outside
of language, so even if God could get through their language, they cannot know Him as He is, or
even as He reveals Himself, since that would entail that they do indeed know, and have some
contact with, an extra-linguistic, unconstructed realm. Accordingly, any special revelation from
God would have to be interpreted through how Christians use their language, and this is the
critical factor. If we borrow from the later Wittgenstein the concept that meaning just is use
(which seems consistent with what Grenz and Franke argue), then whatever God meant by His
special revelation would be meaningful to people only as it is used within the particular linguistic
practices of a given community. And this would apply not only to the enscripturated revelation,