Scott Warren, ETS National Conference, November 17, 2005
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exactly "cannot" in the strict sense of inability, we have misunderstood the breadth
of meaning in this common terminology.
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In doing so, we cloud the debate
concerning human freedom and further, adopt a position that suggests that not
everything is possible, even with God. Here we diminish the perceived character of
God in two respects. We have undermined our understanding of omnipotence and
failed to see that these texts are intended as a positive expression of the purity of his
character.
It is my claim here that texts that speak of human inability to respond to God
(or similar propositions) are statements about the condition of human character and
inclination it is so fundamentally depraved persistently opposed to the reign of
God that it will not respond in genuine faith prior to divine regeneration. This is not
a matter of ability, but of inclination: free, capable agents certainly will not freely
do that which they are not inclined to do.
Application to Theological Issues
Having outlined this framework for understanding the language of freedom,
I believe there are several helpful theological applications. The first is the question
of human responsibility. This model of human freedom provides a clear way to
understand how humans can reasonably be understood to be responsible for sin,
even though they will certainly sin. The certainty does not stem from an inability to
do otherwise, but from the fundamentally sinful inclinations of the natural human
heart. The fundamental indictment of Scripture is not that humans are weak, but
that they are wicked. I have attempted to make this point clear in the reasoning
offered above. The fundamental problem is not that sinners cannot do what they
must, but that they will not do what they can. As such, they are rightly held guilty
for their sin.
Secondly, I believe a distinction between ability and inclination will provide
some assistance in the difficult matter of the origin of sin. Too often, those who
emphasize freedom speak of it as a cause of human actions.
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However, it is
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I believe Calvinists have often gone awry at this point, and in doing so have undermined the
credibility of their otherwise sound arguments, and put them in an unnecessarily defensive position
in matters such as personal responsibility.
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E.g., "Certain persons did something in particular because they are free to do so."