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Scott Warren, ETS National Conference, November 17, 2005

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Historical Debates

In closing, I would like to mention a few specific examples from the history

of Christian theology that I believe could have been improved with a clear

distinction between inclination and ability.

In terms of historical theology, the issue of human freedom generally is

understood to begin most explicitly with Augustine, particularly with regard to his

writings surrounding the Pelagian controversy. Within his great body of work,

Augustine attempted what few theologians have. He tried to provide an explicit

rationale for human responsibility in sins that were not within their power to avoid.

He was challenged on this point because of the positions he espoused on the issues

of divine sovereignty and human freedom.

Augustine used the notion of universal complicity in original sin to argue for

the reasonability of human responsibility for fallen sin, even while holding that the

freedom to do good is hopelessly absent in the fallen condition. One of his tactics

in making this point was the use of extensive hypothetical analogies.

While

Augustine's argument offers an interesting perspective on the issue, I do not believe

that it makes the point he intends.

If, however, he had specified the distinction

These analogies involve situations where a person intentionally sets himself up for the

circumstances in which he would not be able to avoid doing something improper. Examples cited
include that of a sleeping person, whose hand was taken by another to write something shameful,
and thus could not ordinarily be held guilty of what was written. Similarly, one is not responsible
for something he is forcibly made to do while bound. However, if a person became deliberately
drunk so as not to wake when his hand was moved, or allowed himself to be bound so that he could
not resist the force of another, he does incur guilt. In such a case, he suggests, one would rightly be
held guilty for the ensuing acts, even though not free when they took place. Implicated is the notion
of complicity in original sin, which caused a corruption in human nature, thus defending the
appropriateness of guilt in sins committed even in a fallen condition lacking freedom or the power to
resist. Augustine develops these analogies in On Two Souls, Against the Manichaeans, 10.12
(Translated by Albert H. Newman in Philip Schaff (ed.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First
Series, vol. 4. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1974, p. 102). The development of these concepts in
Augustine's later works during and following the Pelagian controversy is discussed by William S.
Babcock ("Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency" Journal of Religious Ethics 16 [Spring 1988], p. 37
ff.)

If one is unable to do something now because of free actions taken in the past that preclude it, the

moral responsibility is inherent in the original free action, not the present lack of freedom. If
original sin renders the human race unable to obey God afterward, it only argues for the increased
seriousness of original sin. It is responsible for all the wickedness that it brings about, both directly
and indirectly. Humans would not add to their guilt by failing to do now something that is not now
within their ability (at least not to the extent that they would if they could). They are guilty for such
failure, but the guilt is attendant to the original sin with its intent. To help make the point, let me
offer a contemporary example. If I am unable to meet financial obligations now, because I