Page 15

Scott Warren, ETS National Conference, November 17, 2005

Page 15

between ability and inclination, he would not have been in a situation where there

was a need to defend the notion of guilt without freedom. The focus of the debate

would have been explicitly on the inclinations of the human heart,

rather than on

human ability.

A second prominent debate on the matter of human freedom was played out

by Luther and Erasmus. In my assessment, both of their works are filled with a

confusion of issues that could have been clarified substantially with the simple

distinction between inclination and ability.

In his essay, Erasmus challenged Luther's notion of human bondage to sin,

among other means, by citing a text in Deuteronomy where Moses stresses to the

Israelites that they have the ability to obey God's commandments and exhorts them

to do so.

While Luther makes some legitimate points in return,

he fails to

address Erasmus' challenge clearly or adequately. Rather he essentially avoids the

squandered my money sinfully in the past, the moral guilt was incurred with the squandering. I was
wrong to squander my funds, in part for the very reason that it would render me unable to meet my
financial obligations at a later date. I do not incur any additional guilt for failing to pay my bills now
when I lack the funds. I am certainly guilty for not paying the bill, but the reason I cannot do so is
because I squandered the funds, and that is the source of my guilt. This, however, is not what those
who would argue that humans are guilty, even though not free, would want to defend. They would
agree that there is guilt incurred in original sin. However they would also assert that additional guilt
is specifically incurred in ongoing sins. Indeed, it is inconceivable how it could be otherwise, in
light of all of the biblical admonitions against present sins and assertions of human responsibility for
them.

I believe this issue of the wickedness of the fallen human heart to be a thoroughly Augustinian

concept.

Deuteronomy 30:11-14 includes fairly explicit words to the effect that they were able to obey

which Luther never directly addresses; Erasmus' introduction of this text is found at: Desiderius
Erasmus, "On the Freedom of the Will," in Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation. The
Library of Christian Classics, Ichthus Edition, ed. E. Gordon Rupp and Philip S. Watson
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969), p. 57.

Ibid., p. 184-85, 204. Luther argues effectively that there is no logical connection between a

command and an ability to carry it out, but does not address the moral connection, from which moral
responsibility would stem. Further, Luther's suggested that Moses' point was that if the people
disobeyed, it was not his fault. Moses fulfilled his responsibility to bring the law to the people
clearly and comprehensibly. It can be noted that this point does nothing to undermine Erasmus'
argument; if anything it reinforces it. Luther also offers examples of a loving parent and a physician
who may command a child or patient to do something that they are unable to do in order to reveal
the inability of the latter. This does make Luther's immediate point that there is no logical
implication of ability when even a moral agent pronounces a "command." However, it will not
make Luther's ultimate point, or discredit Erasmus' unless the authority genuinely intends to hold
the subordinate accountable for fulfilling the command. Certainly in Luther's examples, the
parent/physician has no intention of holding the child/patient accountable for fulfilling the command
(e.g., by punishing them when they fail). Imparting knowledge was the point of their command, not
an expectation of obedience (though they might reasonably hold accountable if the child/patient did
not try to fulfill the command, as this would be a matter of disobedience).