Scott Warren, ETS National Conference, November 17, 2005
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thesis here that this is an unnecessary inference that the typically Arminian
response that unregenerate sinners are free to respond to the Gospel is correct, even
though I hold to a clearly Calvinistic theological framework as reflected by, among
other things, an ordo salutis in which regeneration necessarily precedes faith. How
this is so should become evident as we move along.
The first and largest portion of the paper will explain concepts as I am using
them. This will be followed by a consideration of the language of biblical texts that
seem to discredit my thesis. Finally, I will provide a sampling of theological issues
and debates from the history of the Church where I believe the distinctions I offer
would provide assistance.
Defining Freedom
To provide for a clear discussion, we need to begin by defining and
explaining terms. In the simplest of expressions, I believe that what we mean when
we say that one is free is that one can do what one wants.
1
This is to say that when
one acts, one does so apart from any external compulsion. Without constraints that
compel action inconsistent (or potentially inconsistent) with one's own personal
motives, one's choices and actions are free.
2
There are, of course, many limits upon human freedom.
3
Still, this does not
keep us from saying that we are, to a meaningful degree, and in many real senses,
free. As such, we can build on the definition above, by saying that we are free to
the extent that we can do what we want.
Of course, the critical issue in the debate under consideration is whether we
are free with regard to choices with spiritual implications. These include such
1
I believe this reflects the normal use of language, and has been embraced in more technical
theological discussion as well. For example Jonathan Edwards suggests the same definition
(Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, ed.
Perry Miller, vol. 1, New Haven and London: Yale University, 1957, p. 163).
2
Another way freedom is often described is to say that one is free if one could do otherwise than one
actually does. This is really a derivative of the more basic definition I have offered.
3
For instance, I cannot fly without assistance, even if I want to. Thus, we would say, I am not free
to fly. Such limits may be attributable to our nature and design as creatures (such as lacking the
ability to fly), or due to external limits on our choices. A secure prison cell essentially ensures that a
prisoner is not free to depart from it. Inherent consequences also place certain limits upon our
freedom. I am free to commit a crime as long as I have the means to carry it out. But I am not free
to do so without incurring legal guilt, and likely not without reaping penal consequences. Thus I
may be free to carry out a certain action, but my (free) consideration of it will take into account
related consequences outside my control.