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point, because Rorty`s arguments are made through large-scale historical reconstructions, he resolves

the traditional problematics in ways similar to what he claims the Philosophical tradition has done:

precisely by changing the subject and redefining them away. The differences are twofold. First, Rorty

(and, by implication, ourselves) has finally recognized Philosophical problematics and pseudo-questions.

Second, while the tradition has attempted to do Philosophy by drawing upon witnesses (in the

Philosophical tradition) to build an argument, Rorty`s retrievals of previous thinkers and his

appropriation of the work of peers and colleagues are ad hoc--what Rorty, following the literary critic

Allan Bloom, calls strong misreadings,

--consciously incorporating and weaving in ideas conducive

to his own vision even while ignoring or explaining away counterpositions. As such, then, only with

difficulty can Rorty be critically engaged.

He can always counter that the criticism succeeds only if

based on the presuppositions which his redescriptions have exploded. Failing that, Rorty can continue to

change the subject, call upon a different set of criteria, play-off other aspects of the thinkers and sets of

ideas under discussion, or expand the scope of the story which needs retelling.

At the end of the day,

then, if Rorty has his way in redefining moral virtuosity as tolerance, there will be no possibility for

authentic engagement since public conversation can only proceed among those of like minds who either

already agree on the contours of the story and the validity of the criteria, or have agreed to tolerate

opposing ideas as private opinions unworthy of public dispute. Is it not, then, Rorty`s neo-pragmatism

that has terminated the conversation abruptly?

Strong misreadings are accomplished by textual critics who seek not to understand texts on their own or

their authors` terms. Rather, the critic simply beats the text into a shape which will serve his own purpose. He
makes the text refer to whatever is relevant to that purpose. He does this by imposing a vocabulary a grid`, in
Foucault`s terminology on the text which may have nothing to do with any vocabulary used in the text or by its
author, and seeing what happens (Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, 151).

David L. Hall makes these points clear in Richard Rorty: Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism

(Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), esp. 4-6 and 138-40.

Rorty advises: When you find yourself at an argumentative impasse, baffled by your opponent`s refusal

to stop asking question which you think you really should not have to answer, you can always shift the ground by
raising questions about the vocabulary he or she is using. You can point out that the issue is biased in one`s
opponent`s favor by the unfortunate jargon which has developed, a jargon which gives one`s opponent an unfair
advantage. You can use historical narratives to show why the issue previously discussed is moot and why it needs to
be reformulated in terms which are, alas, not yet available; see Rorty, Philosophy without Principles, in W. J. T.